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Limitations on Campaign Contributions and
Expenditures Are Invalid for Lack of Legitimate
Governmental Interest and Insufficient Tailoring:
Randall v. Sorrell
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF
SPEECH - FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE - The Supreme Court of the
United States held that Act 64, Vermont's campaign finance law,
was in contravention of the First Amendment guarantees of free-
dom of speech and freedom of association with respect to the stat-
ute's contribution and expenditure limitations.
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
In 1997, Vermont enacted a campaign finance reform bill (here-
inafter "Act" or "Act 64")1 that imposed strict contribution limits
on individuals, political parties, and committees, as well as rigid
expenditure restrictions on candidates running for office. 2 Upon
codification, a group consisting of Vermont candidates, voters, con-
tributors, political parties, and committees that participated in
Vermont politics (hereinafter 'Vermont contingency") brought suit
in federal district court against the state officials charged with
enforcement of the Act. 3 The Vermont contingency asserted that
the broad definitions of "contribution"4 and "expenditure,"'5 in
1. Pub. Act No. 64, 1997 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 64 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
2801 (2002)).
2. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006). Act 64 took effect immediately after the
1998 elections and placed the following campaign contribution limits on single individuals
for a two-year general election cycle that encompassed both the primary and general elec-
tion: governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices, $400; state senator, $300;
and state representative, $200. tit. 17, § 2805. Political parties were likewise restricted,
as their donations to candidates could not surpass $2000 during the course of the election
cycle. Id. In addition, the Act created the following expenditure constraints on candidates:
governor, $300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000; other statewide offices, $45,000; state
senator, $4000; state representative (two-member district), $3000; and state representative
(single-member district), $2000. Id. § 2805a.
3. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487. In addition, several other private groups and individ-
ual Vermont citizens joined with state officials in the proceedings in support of the Act. Id.
4. The definition of "contribution" contained within the Act incorporated any donation
on a candidate's behalf that was "intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by"
the candidate. tit. 17, § 2809(c). Likewise, any party's payment that principally benefited
six or fewer candidates who were associated with the party counted towards the party's
contribution allowance. Id. § 2809(d).
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combination with the lack of governmental interest in enacting
the limitations, compromised the legislation's constitutional valid-
ity. 6
The Vermont contingency initially brought suit in the United
States District Court for Vermont.7 The district court agreed with
the Vermont contingency's assertion that the Act's expenditure
limits violated the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.8 The court also held that the limitations Act 64 placed on
contributions from political parties were similarly unconstitu-
tional.9 However, the district court stopped short of invalidating
the entire Act, finding that the statute's other contribution limits
were within constitutional bounds. 10 As a result of each side's dis-
satisfaction with the verdict, both parties lodged appeals in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'I
A divided panel of the circuit court concluded that, not only
were all of the Act's contribution limits constitutional, but the
Act's expenditure limits might also withstand constitutional scru-
tiny, in light of Vermont's compelling interests in preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance thereof and in limiting the amount of
time state officials spend raising campaign funds.12 The panel left
undecided the question of whether the Act's expenditure limits
were narrowly tailored to meet those interests and, accordingly,
remanded the case to the district court in order for such determi-
5. Similarly broad was the Act's definition of "expenditure," which the Legislature
labeled as any "payment, disbursement, distribution, advance, deposit, loan or gift of
money or anything of value, paid or promised to be paid for the purpose of influencing an
election, advocating a position on a public question, or supporting or opposing one or more
candidates." Id. § 2801(3).
6. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 476 (D. Vt. 2000).
7. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
8. Id. at 493. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. More specifically,
the district court found that the restraints on expenditures worked iniquitous harm on the
freedoms of speech and association. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 493. Although the limita-
tions furthered "effective representation, equal access to the political system, and honest,
responsive government," the court concluded that the advancement of these interests could
not overcome the inherent damage to free speech and association. Id.
9. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
10. Id.
11. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2487 (2006).
12. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2004). In assessing the validity of
the expenditure limitations, the panel determined that the level of scrutiny to be applied
was predicated upon the importance of the political activity at issue with respect to effec-
tive speech or political association. Landell, 382 F.3d at 106. Because limits on campaign
spending are considered a direct restraint on speech, the panel concluded that Vermont had
the burden of proving a compelling interest in the enactment of the legislation. Id.
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nation to be made. 13 Thereafter, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether Act 64's expenditure
limits, contribution limits, and a related definitional provision
passed constitutional muster. 14
Justice Breyer delivered the plurality opinion of the Supreme
Court and concluded that the expenditure restraints were incom-
patible with First Amendment interests and well-established
precedent.15 In addition, he found that the contribution limits
were too low and insufficiently tailored to the statute's legitimate
objectives to be constitutionally permissible. 16 The Court was un-
able to sever the constitutionally repugnant provisions, rendering
the entire act invalid. 17
The Court commenced its constitutional analysis of Act 64 by
examining the expenditure limits and their relation to the free
speech guarantees of the First Amendment.' 8 In Buckley v.
Valeo,19 the Supreme Court was faced with a similar campaign
finance regulation. 20 There, it held that the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)21 was unconstitutional with respect
to its restraints on expenditures, but valid with regard to its curb-
ing of campaign contributions. 22 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court stated that both kinds of limitations implicate fundamental
First Amendment rights. 23 The Buckley Court decided that the
13. Landell, 382 F.3d at 136.
14. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487. Because the Court invalidated Act 64 with respect to
its contribution and expenditure limitations, the plurality found it unnecessary to decide
the constitutionality of the Act's definitional provision, which presumed that certain party
expenditures were coordinated with a particular candidate. Id. at 2500.
15. Id. at 2485. Chief Justice Roberts joined in the judgment of the Court, and Justice
Alito joined as to all but parts II-B-1 and II-B-2; Justices Alito and Kennedy each filed
concurring opinions; Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Scalia
joined; Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justice Ginsburg joined, and Justice Stevens joined as to parts II and III. Id. at
2485.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2500. Justice Breyer found that severing sections of Act 64 to avoid constitu-
tional infractions was not feasible, as the Court would then be thrust into the legislative
decision-making process. Id. Instead, he adjudged the prudent course to be that of leaving
the Legislature free to structure the Act according to its own dictates, so long as the regula-
tion complied with the Court's opinion. Id.
18. Id. at 2487. Namely, the Court addressed the effect of spending constraints on the
freedom of political expression. Id. at 2491.
19. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
20. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
21. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by 2 U.S.C § 431 (2002). The Act
imposed limits on contributions to candidates running for federal elective office and re-
straints on candidates' campaign expenditures. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143.
23. Id. at 23.
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Government's proposed justification of the statute's infringement
upon those rights was sufficient to sustain the contribution lim-
its.24 However, in the Court's view, the state's interest in prevent-
ing corruption and its appearance did not warrant the constraints
on expenditures. 25
The Buckley Court's delineation between the two kinds of limi-
tations was premised on the notion that expenditure limitations
inflict substantially harsher restrictions on protected freedoms of
political expression and association than do their contribution
counterparts. 26 Constraints on contributions do not prevent the
contributor from conversing about candidates and issues, whereas
limits on expenditures restrict the number of issues that candi-
dates are able to discuss, reduce the depth to which they are ex-
plored, and stifle the transmission of the issues to larger audi-
ences. 2
7
Vermont, recognizing the unfavorable shadow cast by Buckley
with respect to expenditure limitations, sought to surmount the
precedent by first arguing that it should be overruled. 28 However,
Justice Breyer could find no justification for the repudiation of
Buckley. 29 In the alternative, the State contended that its statute
was distinguishable from that in Buckley. 30 The State's lone ar-
gument differentiating its legislation from the statute in Buckley
was that Act 64's expenditure limits reduced the amount of time
candidates spend raising money. 31 The plurality found this ra-
tionale equally unconvincing, concluding that the Buckley Court
had been aware of the correlation between expenditure limits and
a reduction in fundraising time. 32
Having invalidated the expenditure limitations imposed by Act
64, the Court next addressed whether the law's limitations on
campaign contributions had more severe effects than Buckley con-
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id. at 45.
26. Id. at 23.
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21, 23.
28. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (2006).
29. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489-90. The Court found dubious Vermont's contention that
post-Buckley experience had shown that contribution limits alone could not deter corrup-
tion and its appearance. Id. Supporting its conclusion was the plurality's determination
that the case law following Buckley had not confined Buckley to the status of an aberration
nor vitiated its underlying legal principles. Id. at 2489. See Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
30. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489.
31. Id. at 2490.
32. Id. The Buckley Court acknowledged that in enacting FECA, Congress was at-
tempting to "free candidates from the rigors of financing." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
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templated.3 3 Justice Breyer, recognizing the damaging effects of
contribution limitations set too low, stressed the imperativeness of
setting a constitutional threshold. 34 Establishing this floor, he
deduced, would ensure that challengers are able to maintain effec-
tive campaigns against incumbent officeholders and that all can-
didates are able to accumulate the necessary resources for con-
structive campaigning. 35 Because Act 64's limits were compara-
tively low in relation to contribution restrictions upheld by the
Court in the past, the plurality concluded that they were not
closely drawn to further Vermont's interests. 36
To illustrate the significant discrepancy between the limits up-
held in Buckley and Act 64's restraints, the Court pointed out that
Vermont's contribution limit on campaigns for statewide office
amounted to approximately $57 per election, while the statute in
Buckley prescribed a limit of $1000. 37 Further, the plurality noted
that Vermont's contribution limits, when considered as a whole,
were the lowest in the nation and well below the lowest limit the
Court had previously upheld in Missouri. 38 Vermont's comparable
limit was roughly $200 per election, less than one-fifth of Mis-
souri's, and the Court found this to be too large a gap, notwith-
standing Vermont's relatively smaller population. 39
In addition to Act 64's considerably low contribution limits, Jus-
tice Breyer detailed five equally relevant factors that influenced
the Court's decision that the statute was not narrowly drawn to
effectuate the State's legitimate interests. 40  First, the Court
found that the record emitted a logical inference that Vermont's
constraints on campaign contributions would substantially and
adversely affect the amount of funding challengers were able to
raise in order to be competitive against incumbents. 41 This de-
termination largely rested upon the testimony of the Vermont con-
tingency's expert, who studied the most recent election and found
33. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491.
34. Id. at 2492.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2492-93.
37. Id. at 2493. The Randall Court adjusted the Vermont contribution limit figure to
reflect its value in 1976, which was the year Buckley was decided. Id.
38. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2493-94. The lowest limit sustained by the Court prior to
Randall was the limit of $1075 per election for state auditor in Missouri. Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
39. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2494.
40. Id. at 2495.




that challengers in competitive races would have suffered a reduc-
tion in available funds as a result of contribution restrictions. 42
Rather than challenging the figures submitted by the Vermont
contingency's expert, the State conceded the legitimacy of the per-
centages and instead chose to highlight the opinion of its own ex-
pert. 43 This expert deduced that only a small quantity of all con-
tributions made during the previous three election cycles would
have been affected by Act 64's limits. 44 However, the plurality
dismissed the State's statistics as irrelevant to the Court's central
concern for preserving the viability of challengers in competitive
races. 45  Information respecting average races, Justice Breyer
maintained, fails to consider the vastly more expensive realities of
a competitive race. 46 Consequently, the plurality held that Ver-
mont's analysis of the impact its contribution limits would have on
average races could not refute the conclusion that Act 64's re-
straints on contributions would unduly impede challengers in
competitive races.
47
The second feature of Act 64 that the Court found problematic
was that it subjected political parties to the same low contribution
limits as other contributors. 48 This, Justice Breyer avowed, was a
direct infringement upon the vital political right to associate in a
political party. 49 The plurality also stressed the baleful influence
of the contribution limit on those who wish to donate small
amounts of money to a party. 50 Hypothesizing a scenario in which
six thousand Vermont citizens contributed one dollar to the De-
mocratic Party to ensure a Democratic majority, the Court theo-
rized that if control of the Legislature rested upon the outcome of
three races, the party would be forbidden by the Act from giving
$2000 of the $6000 to each of the candidates embroiled in the cru-
cial races. 51 This reduction in the strength of the political parties
42. Id. The expert conducted a race-by-race analysis of the 1998 legislative elections
and determined that contribution limits would have reduced available funds to Republican
challengers in competitive races by 18% to 53% of their entire campaign income. Id.
43. Id. at 2496.




48. Id. at 2497.
49. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2497. The Court noted, for instance, that the low contribu-
tion limits could interfere with a party's ability to contribute to a candidate's election ad-




to effectuate the will of its citizens was untenable in the plurality's
view and weighed against the statute's constitutional validity.
52
The third aspect of Vermont's campaign finance law that con-
cerned the Court was its handling of volunteer services. 53 Act 64
prescribed that expenses volunteers incurred in the course of
campaign activities, such as travel costs, be counted as contribu-
tions. 54 Justice Breyer emphasized that the absence of an exemp-
tion for such services is magnified when contribution limits are as
low as Vermont's. 55 Thus, because the probability of unjustified
interference was particularly high with respect to campaign vol-
unteers, the broad construction of "contribution" was another ele-
ment weighing in favor of the Act's unconstitutionality. 56
The fourth characteristic the Court focused on was the Act's
failure to adjust its contribution limits for inflation. 57 Such a de-
fect, the plurality noted, would cause the already low limits to fur-
ther decline over time. 58 Inevitably, future legislation would be
necessary to curtail the abatement; legislation, the Court sur-
mised, the incumbent legislators would be in no hurry to pass.
59
The fifth and final distressing feature of Act 64 in the Court's
estimation was the lack of any special justification in the record
for the severe restrictions on contributions other than what was
already advanced in Buckley.60 In the plurality's view, Vermont
had the burden to do more than simply invoke the need to eradi-
cate corruption or its appearance; rather, the State needed to
prove that corruption or its appearance in Vermont warranted the
extreme limitations promulgated by Act 64.61 This it failed to
do. 62
Considering these five factors together, the Court found that the
Act constituted an encumbrance on First Amendment liberties
that was disproportionate to the public interests for which the
52. Id. at 2498.
53. Id.
54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(3) (2002).
55. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498.
56. Id. at 2499.
57. Id.
58. Id. Indeed, the Court found that in real dollars, the Act's limits had declined by
20% since the statute was enacted in 1997. Id.
59. Id.
60. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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legistlation was enacted. 63 As a result, the contribution limita-
tions were deemed constitutionally invalid.64
In a brief concurrence, Justice Alito agreed that both the contri-
bution and expenditure limitations of Act 64 were unconstitu-
tional, but took issue with the plurality's decision to revisit Buck-
ley. 65 As the State failed to address the doctrine of stare decisis,
66
Justice Alito found it unnecessary to reach that issue. 67 Although
Justice Kennedy approved of the plurality's analysis and verdict,
his concurrence expressed concern regarding the Court's role in
the shaping of campaign finance regulation. 68 Without any ex-
perience in the area or the guidance of a well-established body of
law, Justice Kennedy opined that the Court is unequipped for the
legal realm that it has created and perpetuated.69
While Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment of the plu-
rality that both the expenditure and contribution limitations set
forth by Act 64 were unconstitutional, he went farther than Jus-
tice Breyer and called for the overruling of Buckley. 70 This belief
stemmed from Justice Thomas's refusal to distinguish between
contribution and expenditure limitations. 71 In his view, restraints
on contributions have equally nefarious effects upon the freedom
of political expression and association.72
In addition to advocating for similar treatment for the two types
of limitations, Justice Thomas indicated that the Court's inability
to apply the Buckley standard in a consistent and principled fash-
63. Id. Specifically, the Court held that the Act burdened "First Amendment interests
by threatening to inhibit effective advocacy by those who seek election, particularly chal-
lengers; its contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation
in campaigns through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation." Id.
64. Id. at 2500.
65. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring).
66. Stare decisis is the fundamental legal principle advocating judicial respect for a
court's earlier decisions and the rules of law they enumerated. Harris v. United States,
536 U.S. 545, 556-57 (2002) (plurality opinion). As the Court has remarked: "[d]eparture
from precedent is exceptional, and requires 'special justification."' Randall, 126 S. Ct. at
2489. See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (requiring "special justifica-
tion" to overrule precedent in constitutional cases).
67. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Id. Justice Kennedy stated: "[v]iewed within the legal universe we have ratified
and helped create, the result the plurality reaches is correct; given my own skepticism
regarding that system and its operation, however, it seems to me appropriate to concur only
in the judgment." Id.
70. Id. at 2501-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2502. See also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part).
72. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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ion should have compelled the plurality to reject Buckley. 73 Jus-
tice Thomas felt that the plurality's constitutional analysis of con-
tribution limits is incapable of being reduced to a workable for-
mula that states can use to comply with the Court's decisions.
74
Such a deficiency, Justice Thomas argued, rendered the Court an
ill-suited arbitrator of campaign finance regulation.
75
Similar to Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, Justice Ste-
vens's dissent observed that the fundamental importance of stare
decisis called for Buckley's holding on expenditure limits to be
overruled.76 Unlike Justice Thomas, however, Justice Stevens
argued that the constraints placed upon expenditures by Act 64
were constitutionally sustainable in light of several factors.
77
First, Buckley's holding on expenditure limitations itself disturbed
a long-established practice of subjecting campaigns to legislative
limits on both expenditures and contributions. 78 Moreover, Jus-
tice Stevens contended that Randall represented the first post-
Buckley challenge to the constitutionality of expenditure limita-
tions in the campaign context. 79 Thus, while Congress and state
legislatures have consistently relied upon Buckley's handling of
contribution limits, Justice Stevens found no such comparable de-
pendence generated by Buckley's rejection of expenditure con-
straints. 8
0
More substantively, Justice Stevens argued that limits on ex-
penditures were closer in kind to time, place, and manner restric-
tions than to inhibitions on the content of speech. 81 Therefore,
Justice Stevens proposed, the restrictions should be upheld as
long as the functions they serve are "legitimate and sufficiently
73. Id. at 2503.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2506-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. Justice Stevens pointed to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 2 U.S.C. §
241 (repealed 1972); FECA, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by 2 U.S.C. §
431 (2002); and the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263.
Earlier decisions by the Court gave credence to the notion that these limits were permissi-
ble regulations of conduct rather than speech. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612
(1954); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
79. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2508. Accordingly, Justice Stevens argued, the effect of overruling Buckley's
holding on expenditure restraints would be negligible. Id.
81. Id. Justice Stevens argued that it was erroneous to liken restraints on money to
infringement of speech, because the freedom of political expression is maintained in the
former and essentially eviscerated in the latter. Id. Thus, Justice Stevens asserted, Act
64's shackles on expenditures were not antithetic to free speech in the same manner that
direct and substantive restraints would be. Id.
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substantial."82 In Justice Stevens's opinion, Act 64's dual capacity
to safeguard the political arena from usurpation by the rich and to
free candidates from the rigors of fundraising were legitimate in-
terests that could warrant the conclusion that the Act's expendi-
ture limitations were constitutional. 83
Justice Souter, in his dissent, advocated both affirming the
court of appeals' decision to remand the case for further inquiries
with respect to Act 64's expenditure limitations and upholding the
legislation's contribution limits.8 4 Central to Justice Souter's dis-
position was his belief that it was too soon to characterize Act 64's
expenditure limits as a violation of the tenets set forth in Buck-
ley. 5 For one, Justice Souter pointed out that the Buckley Court
gave no indication that it considered earnestly the particular justi-
fication Vermont set forth for its restrictions.8 6 Therefore, in Jus-
tice Souter's opinion, the question was not whether Buckley should
be overruled, but instead, whether careful application of the Buck-
ley framework, in light of the time-protection interest proffered by
Vermont, would actually validate Act 64's restrictions. 87 Since the
Vermont Legislature found pestiferous effects flowing from the
relentless fundraising of its candidates, Justice Souter concluded a
remand was necessary.88
Conceding that Vermont's contribution limits were low, Justice
Souter nevertheless found that they were not a significant depar-
ture from those previously approved by the Court8 9 or those en-
acted by other states. 90 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that this
was suggestive of a widespread clamp-down on campaign contri-
butions rather than an aberration. 91 Thus, Justice Souter opined,
82. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (White, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)).
83. Id.
84. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. Rather than assess the viability of a state's interest in assuaging the burden on
candidates to fundraise incessantly, Justice Souter contended that the Buckley Court fo-
cused almost exclusively on the reduction of corruption and its appearance. Id.
87. Id. at 2512.
88. Id. On remand, it would be decided if the Act's spending limits were the least re-
strictive means of accomplishing its aspirations. Id.
89. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (validating $1075 limit on
contributions to candidates for Missouri state auditor).
90. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Mont. Right to Life
Ass'n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (approving $400 limit for candidates filed
jointly for Governor and Lieutenant Governor); Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov't Ethics and
Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding $500 limit for gubernatorial
candidates in Maine).
91. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2513 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the Court would do best to defer to the legislatures instead of
treading into an area where it has little expertise. 92
Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, con-
cerns surrounding the origin of campaign funds and their capacity
to compromise a candidate's actions while in office were rarely
voiced. 93 Not until later in the nineteenth century, when voters
were deciding between lower class politicians, did the financing of
elections surface as a potential malignancy on civic service. 94 Re-
sponding to corporations' ever more involved role in the financing
of campaigns for the highest offices, from 1907 to 1911, Congress
outlawed corporate political contributions, mandated that con-
gressional candidates divulge the finances of their campaigns, and
limited candidate spending. 95 A decade later, in Newberry v.
United States,96 the Supreme Court made its first foray into the
arena of campaign finance law in order to test the constitutional-
ity of the recently enacted regulations. 97
In Newberry, the Supreme Court considered Thomas H. New-
berry's expenses in pursuit of the Republican nomination for
United States Senator for the State of Michigan. 98 The federal
law regulating campaign spending provided that no senatorial
candidate's expenditures could exceed the lower of $10,000 or the
limit provided by state law. 99 In Newberry, Michigan's law was
more restrictive, prohibiting expenditures by or on behalf of a can-
didate in any amount surpassing twenty-five percent of the an-
nual salary for the office sought. 10 In 1919, a federal grand jury
indicted Newberry, his campaign staff, and some of his supporters
for conspiring to violate the spending limit provisions of the legis-
lation. 10' One year later, Newberry was convicted.10 2  The Su-
92. Id.
93. ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGN, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, at xvii (1988).
94. Id. at xvii. This phenomenon, Mutch argued, was the result of a growing concern
among the electorates that the policymaking power of their elected representatives was
being compromised by the influence of those who provided campaign funds. Id. Such in-
creased scrutiny led several states to enact disclosure laws supplying voters with informa-
tion on the origins and uses of campaign donations and ultimately precipitated the first
federal campaign finance law in 1907. Id.
95. Id. at xviii.
96. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
97. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 232.
98. Id. at 244.
99. Id. at 244-45.
100. Id. at 244. In 1918, this equated to $1875 for a senatorial primary. MUTCH, supra
note 93, at 16. Newberry spent nearly one hundred times that amount in his attempt to
defeat his opponent, Henry Ford. Id.
101. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 240.
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preme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Congress'
power to regulate the manner in which elections are held extended
to the practice of fixing the maximum sum a candidate may spend
or cause to be contributed to secure his nomination. 103
The Newberry Court established that congressional authority
over elections is specified, and thus restricted, by Article I, Section
4 of the Constitution. 0 4 Although elections must satisfy a pleth-
ora of prerequisites and are subject to a myriad of potentially de-
terminative variables, the Supreme Court held that Congress'
right to regulate elections did not equate to a broad power to con-
trol either the prerequisites or the variables. 10 5 On federalism
principles, 10 6 the Newberry Court struck down the federal cam-
paign finance regulation as an impermissible interference with the
domestic affairs of the state and an equally menacing infringe-
ment upon liberties held by the public. 107 The Supreme Court left
untouched the constitutionality of spending thresholds, choosing
instead to rest its decision on the basis that Congress had no
power to regulate primary elections. 108
The Supreme Court's decision in Newberry created a chilling ef-
fect on Congress that manifested itself in the absence of stringent
legislation designed to penetrate campaign finance matters. 10 9
During this period, congressional aversion to legislation that
would significantly curb contributions to and expenditures of can-
102. Id. at 240. Fifteen supporters were also found guilty. Id.
103. Id. at 247.
104. Id at 247-48. Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: "[t]he times, places
and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1.
105. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 257. The Newberry Court pointed to such possible electoral
determinative factors as "voters, education, means of transportation, health, public discus-
sion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of the candidate .. " Id.
106. The Supreme Court's invocation of federalism principles was a consequence of how
senators were elected at the time the law was passed. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND
FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE COURTS 16 (2005). Unlike modern
practice, senators were chosen by state legislatures in 1911. Id.
107. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 258.
108. Id. See, also MUTCH, supra note 93, at 18. The failure of the Newberry Court to
explicitly address the constitutionality of campaign and expenditure limitations in combi-
nation with the fragmented nature of the Court's opinion left Congress unclear as to the
boundaries of its legislative power with respect to campaign financing. Id. at 18-19. Fur-
thering the confusion was the fact that four Justices in the dissent found the provisions
regulating House races completely constitutional. UROFSKY, supra note 106, at 16.
109. MUTCH, supra note 93, at 22. Although Congress enacted the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 to strengthen the 1907-1911 amendments, the limits prescribed by
the legislation could easily be evaded, and successful prosecutions were rare. Id.
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didates running for office diluted the Supreme Court's case load
with respect to campaign finance reform. 110 When a challenge did
reach the Court in the immediate years following Newberry, it per-
tained only to an ancillary regulation requiring the disclosure of
contributions and expenditures."' While Burroughs v. United
States did not directly address the constitutional implications of
spending ceilings, it did foreshadow a number of the essential
components of the constitutional debate. 112
In Burroughs, the Supreme Court considered federal legislation
that required the treasurer of certain political committees to keep
a detailed account of all contributions made to the committee.
113
The petitioners, who had been indicted by a federal grand jury on
charges of specified reporting violations, argued that congressional
authority did not extend to the regulating of presidential electors'
campaigns." 4 Rather, the petitioners contended that this power
was vested in the states, as Congress was limited by Article II,
Section 1 of the Constitution. " 5
The Supreme Court rejected such a narrow view and reaffirmed
Congress' right to pass regulations pertaining to campaign fi-
nance. 1 6 In addition, the Burroughs Court indicated that it was
the responsibility of the Legislature, not the courts, to determine
the best approach to vitiate the presence of corruption in elec-
tions.1 17 Since Congress reasonably determined that there was a
correlation between the public disclosure of political contributions
and a reduction of corruption in elections, the Supreme Court saw
110. Id.
111. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
112. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544-48.
113. Id. at 541-42. The term "political committee" included any organization that "ac-
cept[ed] contributions for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election
of presidential and vice presidential electors in two or more states." Id. at 541.
114. Id. at 540, 544. The violations centered on Burroughs's willful failure to submit
statements concerning campaign contributions. Id. at 543.
115. Id. Article Il, Section 1 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power to
appoint electors and specify the day on which they shall give their vote. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 3.
116. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545. The Burroughs Court considered this power "essential
to preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment
or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption." Id.
117. Id. at 547-48. The Supreme Court held that so long as the means adopted are
"really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they
conduct to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted, and the
end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone." Id. See also Ste-
phenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932) (refusing to inquire into the extent the legisla-
tive means actually accomplish their legitimate ends).
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no reason to displace the means designed to achieve this pur-
pose. 118
In United States v. UAW-CIO, 119 the Supreme Court had the oc-
casion to make its first attempt at resolving the constitutional
questions surrounding contribution and expenditure restraints.
120
The legislation at issue prohibited corporations and labor organi-
zations from making any contribution or expenditure in connec-
tion with the campaign of candidates for federal office. 121 The
UAW-CIO was charged with using union dues to fund commercial
broadcasts calculated to persuade the electorate to select certain
candidates for Congress in the 1954 elections. 122 However, after
providing a detailed history of Congress' efforts to curtail the in-
fluence of money in politics, the Supreme Court sidestepped the
question of whether Congress' regulation of contributions and ex-
penditures was constitutional. 123
Buckley v. Valeo is the seminal case in campaign finance law, as
the Supreme Court finally addressed the constitutionality of limits
on political contributions and expenditures. 124 The suit was origi-
nally brought by an assortment of political entities who challenged
provisions of FECA, 125 which limited contributions to $1000 to any
single candidate, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by
any one contributor. 126 Additionally, the statute incorporated an
expenditure restriction of $1000 per year on individuals and
groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate."
127
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
finding a "clear and compelling interest" on the part of the Gov-
ernment in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, up-
held the validity of the statute's limitations on contributions and
expenditures. 128 The political candidates and groups in opposition
to the legislation argued on appeal that the restrictions on the use
118. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 548.
119. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
120. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 568.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 590-91. The Supreme Court instead only determined a question of statutory
construction that allowed the prosecution of the labor organization to continue in the dis-
trict court. Id. at 591.
124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
125. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by 2 U.S.C § 431 (2002).
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. The plaintiffs were a candidate for the Presidency of the
United States, a United States Senator who was a candidate for re-election, a potential
contributor and various political organizations. Id. at 7-8.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 10 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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of money for political objectives constituted an infringement on
communication that was in derogation of the First Amendment. 129
The Supreme Court, noting that Congress' power to regulate
federal elections is undisputed, confined its inquiry to whether the
specific legislation enacted by Congress hindered First Amend-
ment interests or detrimentally affected a challenger's attempt to
run a successful campaign.130 The Buckley Court found that the
stark demarcation between how the limitations were viewed by
the parties further sharpened the constitutional analysis.131 The
group in charge of enforcing the legislation argued that the re-
strictions served to regulate conduct and that any resulting inter-
ference with the freedoms of speech and association were mini-
mal. 132
The conflicting contention, as enunciated by the political candi-
dates and groups, framed the limitations on contributions and ex-
penditures as a direct and invidious intrusion upon First Amend-
ment liberties. 133 The Supreme Court ruled somewhere in the
middle, as the Court contrasted expenditure and contribution limi-
tations by alluding to their divergent effects.1 34 Where expendi-
ture limitations unavoidably reduce the quantity and quality of a
candidate's expression to a significant degree, the Buckley Court
129. Id. at 11. The challengers' argument was premised on the notion that "meaningful
political communication in the modern setting" could be accomplished only through the
expenditure of money. Id.
130. Id. at 13-14. The Supreme Court indicated the gravity of this examination, explain-
ing that contribution and expenditure limitations function "in an area of the most funda-
mental First Amendment activities." Id. at 14. The Buckley Court considered the ability to
discuss and debate the qualifications of candidates central to the operational capacity of the
government as provided for by the Constitution. Id.
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
132. Id. The respondents included the Secretary of the United States Senate and the
Clerk of the United States House of Representatives as well as the Federal Election Com-
mission, the Attorney General of the United States and the Comptroller General of the
United States. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 15. The court of appeals found that the provisions should be viewed as regu-
lating conduct, not speech. Id. at 16. In arriving at this determination, the court of appeals
relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. In O'Brien, a defendant claimed that the First Amendment prohib-
ited his prosecution for burning his draft card because his act was "symbolic speech" insofar
as it was a "demonstration against the war and against the draft." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the Government had a
substantially important interest in regulating the nonspeech element that was not con-
nected to the inhibition on speech. Id. at 376-77. Further, the O'Brien Court found that
the encroachment on First Amendment freedoms was incidental in comparison to the fur-
therance of this governmental interest. Id. The Buckley Court distinguished O'Brien on
the basis that expenditures of money could not be equated with such conduct as the de-
struction of a draft card. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
134. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21.
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found that a restriction on the amount one person or group may
contribute to a candidate imposes only a minor encumbrance on
the contributor's capacity to partake in free communication. 135
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld FECA's $1000 contribu-
tion limit, finding such restraints permissible, provided that the
Government establishes that the limits are closely drawn to a
"sufficiently important interest."136 The Buckley Court found that
the Government's purported interest, preventing corruption and
its appearance, qualified as "sufficiently important" to substanti-
ate the statute's contribution limits. 137 In addition, the Buckley
Court concluded that the contribution limits were closely drawn,
while cautioning that this might not always be the case if the level
or amount of the limit is particularly harsh. 138 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court found no evidence supporting the political candi-
dates' and groups' contention that the limitations disadvantaged
major party challengers.139 Since the threat of corruption and its
appearance pertained to challengers and incumbents alike, the
Buckley Court determined that Congress had sufficient motive for
establishing the same contribution parameters upon each of the
factions involved in the political race. 1
40
135. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the nocuous effects of expenditure restraints
stem from money's essential role in communicating ideas in modern mass society. Id. at
19. In contrast, contribution limitations are less harmful because a contribution is only a
general show of support for a candidate and his views, as opposed to an illustration of the
rationale behind that support. Id. at 21. Likewise, the Buckley Court found that limits on
expenditures place a more onerous burden on associational freedoms than their contribu-
tion counterpart. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Id. at 25-26. The Government also proffered two additional supplementary inter-
ests justifying the restrictions. Id. First, the Government contended that the limitations
hindered the power of affluent persons and groups to disproportionately influence elections
thereby allowing all citizens an equal opportunity to affect the outcome of elections. Id.
Second, the Government argued that the restrictions served to dissipate the cost of political
campaigns, thus opening the political field to candidates devoid of large amounts of capital.
Id. at 26. However, the Supreme Court decided that it was unnecessary to look past the
legislation's primary corruption-preventing purpose. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
138. Id. at 21. The Supreme Court concluded that the $1000 contribution ceiling was
engineered precisely to effectuate the Government's aspiration to reduce corruption and its
appearance. Id. at 28. Because it was narrowly tailored, the Supreme Court found that the
restriction did not substantively undermine political discussion concerning candidates and
campaign issues. Id.
139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 32.
140. Id. at 33. The Supreme Court also explained that major party challengers have a
tendency to be known throughout the district or state in which they are running, which
helps to alleviate the political candidates' and groups' concerns about visibility. Id. at 32.
Moreover, the Court cited statistics in the record showing that challengers are capable of
raising large amounts of money for campaigning and that a substantial number of recent
challengers have actually outspent their incumbent rivals. Id. at 33 nn.35-37.
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The Supreme Court found the expenditure limitations imposed
by the Act to be substantially more deleterious than the restric-
tions on contributions.'14 The majority held that the Govern-
ment's rationale in preventing corruption and its appearance was
insufficient to justify the fetters on expenditures, because the limi-
tations did not adequately correlate with the eradication of those
hazards.' 42 The Supreme Court concluded that this chasm be-
tween the Government's intention and the actual effects of the
legislation developed from the inherent shortcomings of the ex-
penditure provision. 143 The Buckley Court theorized that, so long
as persons and groups avoided expenditures that expressly backed
an identifiable candidate, their expenditures would fall outside
the scope of the Act. 144
In addition to the Act's failure to further a substantial govern-
mental interest, the majority observed that the legislation mark-
edly infringed upon First Amendment freedom of expression.1
45
Although the Government asserted its interest in smoothing the
financial discrepancies between individuals and groups intending
to influence the outcome of elections, the Supreme Court rejected
this justification. 146 The First Amendment, the Buckley Court de-
clared, did not comport with the principle of silencing one sector of
society for the betterment of another. 147
Following Buckley, the Supreme Court further clarified the
scope of congressional power to regulate contributions in Califor-
nia Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Commission.148 The Califor-
nia Medical Association (hereinafter "CMA"), an unincorporated
organization, challenged a provision of FECA 149 that prohibited
individuals and unincorporated associations from contributing
more than $5000 per year to any multi-candidate political commit-
141. Id. at 39. The Supreme Court declared that the expenditure limitations could not
be justified by merely reiterating the necessity to maximize the utility of the constitution-
ally permissible contribution restraints. Id. at 44.
142. Id. at 45. In making this point, the Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argu-
ment that the peril of large expenditures was as great as that of large contributions. Id.
143. Id.
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
145. Id. at 47-48. The Supreme Court pointed out that the act of promoting the election
or defeat of candidates for office is entitled to the same protection under the First Amend-
ment as general political dialogue. Id. at 48.
146. Id. at 48-49.
147. Id.
148. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
149. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002).
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tee. 150 The CMA contended that the Act's contribution limitations
amounted to a restraint on expenditures, since they interfered
with the CMA's ability to engage in political speech through a po-
litical committee. 151
The Supreme Court rejected the CMA's equation of the chal-
,lenged contribution limit with the expenditure restraints in Buck-
ley and held that the CMA's political speech was neither the type
contemplated by Buckley nor the kind protected by the First
Amendment.152 The Supreme Court's decision rested on the fact
that the CMA's political committee was engaged in independent
political advocacy and thus was not the "mouthpiece" of the
CMA.' 5 3 In making this determination, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a natural extension of Buckley. 154 Thus, in California Medi-
cal Ass'n, limitations on contributions to a multi-candidate politi-
cal committee enjoyed the same validation as the restraints on
contributions to a particular candidate's campaign that were up-
held in Buckley. 1
55
A more profound expansion of Buckley was undertaken by the
Supreme Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. 1
56
In Nixon, the question confronting the Court was whether the fed-
eral limits approved in Buckley also defined the range of permissi-
ble state regulations. 157 In 1994, the Missouri Legislature enacted
restrictions on contributions to candidates for state office. 158 Con-
150. CMA, 453 U.S. at 185. The Federal Election Commission believed that the CMA
had violated this provision, and just prior to the initiation of a civil enforcement action
against it, the CMA filed this declaratory judgment action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. Id. at 186. The CMA challenged the constitu-
tionality of the contribution limitations. Id.
151. Id. at 195. In addition, the CMA argued that, because the provision regulated
contributions made to multi-candidate political committees, the Government's interest in
the reduction of corruption and its appearance, recognized in Buckley as sufficient to sus-
tain the limitations, was inapplicable. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that if
Congress was prohibited from regulating the contributions from individuals and groups to
multi-candidate political committees, the contribution limitations upheld in Buckley would
be rendered ineffective. Id. at 198-99.
152. Id. at 196.
153. Id. Although the Supreme Court admitted that the CMA would probably not do-
nate money to the political committee unless it adhered to its political philosophy, this
alignment of interests was insufficient to transform the political committee's speech into
CMA's. Id.
154. Id. at 197.
155. CMA, 453 U.S. at 197.
156. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). Shrink Missouri Government PAC is a political action com-
mittee. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 383.
157. Id. at 381-82.
158. Id. at 382. The statute at issue imposed contribution limits varying from $250 to
$1000 depending on the specific state office for which the candidate was campaigning. Id.
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sequently, PAC sought to enjoin the enforcement of the contribu-
tion regulation, arguing that the legislation was unconstitu-
tional. 1
59
The Supreme Court once again reiterated its delineation be-
tween expenditures and contributions, treating limits on expendi-
tures as direct constraints on speech, while finding restrictions on
contributions less detrimental to expression. 160 In defense of its
statute, Missouri asserted the same interest in the prevention of
corruption and its appearance that was held to sustain similar
contribution regulations in Buckley.161 PAC, in deference to Buck-
ley, did not dispute the validity of the corruption-prevention inter-
est. 162 Instead, it chose to challenge the constitutionality of the
contribution limits on the basis that Missouri lacked the evidence
to demonstrate that this interest actually existed here. 1
63
However, the Supreme Court found that Buckley sufficiently il-
lustrated the dangers of munificent, corrupt contributions.
164
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Missouri was justified in rely-
ing on the evidence and findings accepted in Buckley.165 Accord-
ingly, Missouri's contribution limitations were upheld as the Su-
preme Court adopted the Buckley analysis for examining state
contribution and expenditure restrictions. 1
66
The juxtaposition of our political structure - steeped in democ-
ratic ambition and guided by First Amendment protections -
with the inevitable excesses fostered by such a system has rele-
gated campaign finance reform to a study in constitutional vaga-
ries. The perversion of electoral discourse, due to unequal and
inordinate campaign contributing and spending, requires legisla-
159. Id. at 383. More specifically, PAC claimed that the contribution statute violated its
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
160. Id. at 386. Thus, the Supreme Court stated, "restrictions on contributions require
less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending." Id. See also Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986) (holding that
restraints on donations need not be justified to the same degree as expenditure limitations).
161. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 391. PAC demanded that Missouri prove the corrosive effect of unrestricted
contributions on Missouri elections or a belief on the part of Missouri's voters that such a
malignant influence existed. Id.
164. Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (finding that the 1972 election
demonstrated that the problems posed by large contributions were not illusory).
165. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 393. In addition to the Buckley evidence, Missouri submitted an
affidavit of the co-chair of the state legislature committee on campaign finance reform that
expressed concern about large contributions. Id. The district court also cited a number of
newspaper stories detailing large contributions made to campaigns which supported infer-
ences of misconduct. Id.
166. Id. at 397-98.
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tive action to distance our elected representatives from the influ-
ential and unrelenting monetary turnstile that their pockets have
become.
As legislatures have moved to alleviate this threat, judicial in-
terference has stymied their efforts.167 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized a governmental interest in the realm of
campaign finance, the Court has provided little consistency, im-
perfect logic, and artificial distinctions in its handling of at-
tempted reform. 168 Consequently, a nebulous analytical frame-
work has arisen that splintered the Court into a cacophony of di-
vergent views while lending little clarity to states in their pursuit
of compliance. 
169
What the Buckley Court set forth with respect to campaign fi-
nance regulation, the Randall opinion blithely followed, departing
only to establish a lower threshold on contribution restrictions. 170
At the crux of Justice Breyer's analysis was the principle recog-
nized in Buckley that both contribution and expenditure limita-
tions substantially compromise First Amendment interests in
speech. 171 The plurality opinion implicitly dismissed Justice Ste-
vens's contention that restrictions on campaign finance were per-
missible time, place, and manner limitations on conduct which
only incidentally burden speech. 172
The Court's rejection of and refusal to even address this conten-
tion is troubling. For one, political contributions and expenditures
cannot in any way be equated with pure speech. Rather, they are
merely mediums of exchange which promote speech. 173  There-
167. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n (FEC), 518
U.S. 604 (1996) (striking down expenditure limitations on political parties in connection
with a general election campaign for congressional office); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (invalidating
constraints on expenditures instituted by FECA).
168. For instance, Buckley and its progeny have made the distinction between expendi-
tures and contributions. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2488 (2006). However, the
Court has continually overlooked the fact that independent expenditures by an individual
or political action committee on behalf of a candidate can function with all the same corrup-
tive force as a contribution directly to that candidate. FREDERICK G. SLABACH, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, at xxii (Frederick G. Slabach ed., 1998).
Moreover, as Slabach suggests: "[t]he size of a contribution to a political action committee
has just as much of an effect on the quantity and quality of debate about the issues as the
amount of that committee's expenditures, since without the contribution, it can make no
expenditures." Id.
169. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S.
93 (2003); CMA v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
170. Randall, 126 S. Ct at 2485.
171. Id. at 2488.
172. Id. at 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. SLABACH, supra note 168, at xxi.
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fore, the giving or spending of capital is more akin to a physical
act. 174 This argument does not presuppose a fissure between cam-
paign finance reform and political expression. To the contrary,
the inquiry acknowledges that limitations interfere with the in-
trinsic speech protections of the First Amendment, and instead
shifts the focus to what level of scrutiny should be applied. 175
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
a statute that banned the burning of draft cards.176 O'Brien
claimed that by burning his draft card, he was exercising his right
to free speech. 177 However, the Court disagreed and found that
his act was not pure speech but expression-related conduct.
178
The function of O'Brien's draft card pyrotechnics to articulate his
stance on the Vietnam War is analogous to the contribution of
money to political campaigns as a statement of support for a can-
didate or his party.179 Both are little more than a vehicle for po-
litical expression and thus, cannot be considered a direct and sub-
stantial First Amendment intrusion.
The Randall Court bypassed this issue, ostensibly deferring to
the Buckley Court's rationale for treating contribution and expen-
diture limitations as blunt restraints on free expression. 80 In
Buckley, the Court determined that because of money's exalted
place "in today's mass society," the utilization of capital has be-
come imperative for "effective political speech."' 8 ' However, legis-
latures should not be confined by the First Amendment in their
attempt to break, or merely slacken, political entities' dependence
on the use of such extravagant forms of dissemination.
Act 64's stringent contribution and expenditure limitations have
the capacity to shape political discourse in Vermont in a new and
appealing manner without "restricting the number of issues dis-
174. Id.
175. J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 168, at 53, 57.
176. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
177. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
178. Id. The Court additionally concluded that an important governmental interest was
served by preventing the burning of draft cards. Id. at 379-80. See also supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
179. Wright, supra note 175, at 53, 59. The Vermont law targeted the money itself and,
significantly, did not apply to the communication or other campaign services that the
money could buy. Id.
180. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2488-89 (2006).
181. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). The Buckley Court stated: "[t]he elector-
ate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and infor-
mation has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of
effective political speech." Id.
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cussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached." 18 2 By compelling candidates to concentrate more on lo-
cal organizing, informative mailings or door-to-door canvassing
and less on transient television infomercials and glossy print ads,
the restrictions could actually engender a more complex analysis
of the issues broached. 183
The Vermont Legislature's decision to rein in campaign finances
promoted real dialogue by emphasizing the substance of the
speaker's voice over the depth of his pockets. 18 4 Far from suffocat-
ing political expression, Act 64 elevates it. 185 As the political ad-
vantages of wealthy citizens, candidates, and organizations dissi-
pate, the pertinent concerns of the Vermont constituencies would
come to the forefront, away from the dizzying glare of glitzy ex-
penses designed to obscure them. 186 Consequently, the Vermont
legislation's contribution and expenditure limitations can only be
seen as a minimal infringement upon First Amendment liberties
and should be upheld as long as their purpose is "legitimate and
sufficiently substantial."
'1 8 7
In a break with precedent, 1 88 the Randall Court went on to hold
that the governmental interest in the prevention of corruption or
its appearance could not sustain Vermont's contribution limits. 1R9
Although Randall is the first case to do so, Justice Breyer was cor-
rect in noting that previous cases had foretold such a fate should
contribution constraints reach a point of particular severity.1 90
Yet, Vermont's contribution limits could hardly be classified as a
significant departure from those validated by the court in Nixon,
when factoring in Vermont's substantially smaller population. 191
182. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
183. Wright, supra note 175, at 53, 66.
184. Id. at 72-73.
185. Id. at 72.
186. Id.
187. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding $1075 limit on
contributions to candidates for Missouri state auditor); CMA v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)
(validating $5000 limit on contributions to multi-candidate political committees).
189. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
190. Id. at 2492. In Nixon, the Court stated that, in making its determination concern-
ing the constitutionality of contribution limitations, it considered "whether the contribution
limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the
sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless."
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397. In Buckley, the Court similarly asserted that "contribution restric-
tions could have severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates
and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
191. Vermont has 1/9th the population of Missouri. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2494.
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If the contribution constraints upheld in Nixon could not "drive
the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice," 19
2 it
seems specious to hold that Vermont's admittedly more generous
per citizen limitations can. 193
Perhaps the most egregious error by the plurality was its failure
to adequately address Vermont's purported interest in reducing
the amount of time candidates spend raising money. 194 The Court
dismissed the claim in one paragraph on the basis that the Buck-
ley Court was aware of the connection between campaign finance
regulation and a reduction in fundraising time but was, neverthe-
less, not persuaded. 195 Yet, in 1976, at the time Buckley was de-
cided, candidate time protection was not viewed as a main objec-
tive of campaign finance reform. 196 Indeed, the Buckley Court
mentions it only i-' passing. 197
Candidate time distraction has since evolved into a far more se-
rious predicament as a corollary to the momentous change in the
institutional procedures governing both fundraising and cam-
paigning. 198 As the arms race mentality dominates candidates'
approach to securing finances, more time is given to dinners, ban-
quets, and golf outings that produce the necessary monetary am-
munition. Consequently, less concern is given to the needs of the
citizens these candidates are bound to serve. The Court, in sum-
marily rebuffing Vermont's professed interest in protecting its
citizens, failed to use due diligence to ensure that the passage of
time had not rendered the slight findings in Buckley anachronis-
tic.
Campaign contribution and expenditure limitations are rooted
in the premise that unregulated financial disbursements made to
and by candidates running for office illegitimatizes the electoral
process. When big money infiltrates our highest offices and ema-
nates from our most esteemed representative positions, voters be-
come disillusioned. Legislatures must be allowed to act to restore
faith in the social contract at the foundation of our political struc-
192. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397.
193. The plurality conceded that, per citizen, Vermont's limit is "slightly more gener-
ous." Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2494.
194. Id. at 2490.
195. Id.
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ture. Where state and federal governments prove that cosmetic
changes are not enough to salvage the integrity of campaigns, the
Court must afford them reasonable deference to carry out what is
in the best interests of their citizens.
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